STUDIES IN ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE.*
II. THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY.

VI
The Schedule of 1875 does not purport to be a complete
code of procedure. Its framers had in view certain specific ends
for which the schedule was added to the Act, and it was not intended to do more than accomplish them. In the first place, it
was desired to wipe out the many differences which had made
the procedures of the various old courts as strange to each other
as those of foreign countries; in the second, there were to be
added to the new uniform procedure certain definite facilities
strongly favored by the Judicature Commissioners in their first
report. These were the limits within which the new rules were
to operate. Outside them, the old procedure was to remain, as
the act expressly required.1 14
A definite body of raw materials, out of which they should
work up their composition, was thus placed in the hands of the
draftsmen who were charged with the duty of preparing the
rules. They had before them the practice of the common law
courts, as directed in the Common Law Procedure Acts and the
Rules of Court made under them;115 on the equity side there
were the Chancery Practice Amendment Acts and the Consolidated General Orders of i86o;116 there -were also concrete sets
of rules in the courts of probate and admiralty.1 17 Without actually codifying the several thousand sections of adjective law
before them, they selected such of them as would fit properly into
the new scheme, and rearranged them according to what, in the
conduct of an action, would be as nearly as possible chronological
sequence. To these sections which were repeated verbatim out
of the old Acts and rules they added another lot of old sections
*Continued from the January issue, 63
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in which slight alterations were necessary, either in the substance
or in the form of expression. Then were added the sections
containing the entirely new matter they were instructed to include. The whole amounted to four hundred and fifty-six
rules, which were divided up into sixty-three orders, each dealing with one general subject and containing from one to thirtyfour rules.'1 " Of these nearly a half are repeated from former
statutes or regulations, ipsissinis verbis or with slight alterations.119 The great virtue of the rules thus formulated was that
they would apply to all divisions of the new court. An old common law rule, repeated in the schedule, would apply not only to
an action proceeding in the Queen's Bench Division of the
High Court, but equally to an action in the Chancery Division if
the same question of practice arose. In some instances the repeated rules applied principally to business which would remain,
as it was before, in the common law or the equity side of the
court, but frequently conflicting procedural methods were
smoothed into uniformity by merely adopting the old rule out of
one practice or the other. 12 0 The net result was that the schedule
completed the so-called fusion of law and equity by exchanging
in their procedures some of the rigor of one for some of the freedom of the other, with the least possible amount of anything
which might be a complete innovation to both. 21
" This was the form of the old Orders in Chancery.
" About two hundred and ten Rules.
'For instance, in the Rules on Execution.
'"Commending this attitude, the ever-watchful SoLIcIToas' JOux.AL said
(i9 SOL. J. 252. February 6. 1875) : "The Act itself makes provisions containing the greatest possible capacity for leaving things pretty much as they are,
combined with the greatest possible capacity for ultimately making great
alterations.

.

.

. The new Rules seem to proceed upon a similar method.

The intention is that the old system shall transmute itself in working into
the new, the direction and manner of its change being shaped and guided by
the exigencies of the occasion and by practical experience. A procedure cannot, any more than a constitution, be born full grown.

. . . Any change

must be initiated and worked out by the present practitioners as best it can.
The new rules must not fit too tightly at first and in some respects must be
left to be shaped by experience. It must be remembered, too, that it is a
difficult thing to embody what is very much in the nature of an alteration of
the spirit of a procedure in distinct specific rules.! These are sentences that might be-profitably read by rule-makers oztside
of England as welL
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A brief survey of the sixty-three orders in the schedule will
illustrate this clearly. They are here divided into five groups,
for convenience of treatment.
The first fifteen orders deal with the preliminary steps in an
action, carrying the matter to the point where appearance has
been entered or, for want of one, the plaintiff has taken his
judgment. Their general effect is to make the common law procedure apply.to the opening of hostilities in all divisions of the
High Court.
The opening rules1 22 throw every litigation, whether at
common law, in equity, probate, or admiralty, into the form of
an "action," begun by writ of summons. This marks a great
change, especially in equity, admiralty, and probate procedure,
from which bill, information, cause in ren, citation and other
, picturesque names are thus deleted.1 23 A blank form for the
writ having been given in the appendix, 1 24 four orders125 go on
to describe what information must be given in it as to the identity of the parties and of their causes of action. The substance
of the latter is to be contained in an "indorsement" on the back
of the writ-a short "statement of the nature of the claim made,
or of the relief or remedy required in the action." This rule
completes the gradual disappearance from the pleader's armory
of those curiously wrought weapons devised by the early clerks
in chancery, out of whose ingenuity sprang the whole romance
of assuimpsit and the other descendants of Westminster the Second.' 28 But, though the identity of all the old writs is now
' Order I, Rule r, and Order.11, Rule T.
'"At this point the subject of an interpleader proceeding, which is not
begun by writ of summons, is treated of in Order I, Rule 2. Interpleader

applications will be granted in any case where either the old equity or law
courts would have granted them, after service of a writ and before defence
pleaded.
Appendix A, Part L
' Orders II, I1, IV and VIL
'The Uniformity of Process Act, 1832, introduced a uniform writ of
summons for all personal actions, which stated in an indorsement the nature
of8 the action. e. g.. debt, trespass, etc. The Real Property Limitation Act,
1 ,3, abolished all but three of the old real and mixed actions. The Common
Law Procedure Act, 1852, reduced all writs of summons to three: one for use
in all personal actions, making no mention at all of the cause of action,
containing merely a summons to appear: another in replevin; and a third in
ejectment, which made uniform the writ in the remaining real actions. The
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merged into the single form, four distinct classes of indorsements are provided for, each to be followed by a different line of
attack. Unliquidated claims are to be briefly described in a "general indorsement," leaving more detailed information to be supplied in a statement of claim delivered after appearance; liquidated claims may be "specially indorsed," in which case
no further statement of claim need be made; the special indorsement peculiar to actions founded on negotiable instruments, instituted in 1855,12T is retained; and in cases where an
accounting must precede the determination of rights, the plaintiff
must ask for it on his writ so that an order for an account may
issue at once upon the defendant's appearance. 128 Of these four,
the general indorsement was quite new; the others had been in
use before, either in equity or at law. 12 9 Three orders1 3 0 regulate the formal issue of the writ from the court office, the issue
of concurrent writs and the renewal of writs after a lapse of
time.1 31
Three orders are then devoted to the requirements for
proper service. Apart from a few new provisions as-to service
1875 Rule assimilated replevin and ejectment to personal actions, making
universal a single form of writ and restoring the indorsement to inform the
defendant what was claimed.
'"Under the Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18S5. If
the plaintiff sued on a promissory note -or bill of exchange, he would indorse
on his writ a copy of the instrument and allow credit for any payments
made. The defendant would then not be allowed even to appear to the writ
unless he showed, on affidavit, that he had a defence on the merits.
'= Such order will issue of course unless the defendant shows there is
sone preliminary question to be tried. Order XV, Rule x. This merely extezwded the former Chancery practice to the Common Law side, although the
advantage of a simple indorsement on a writ over the old bill in equity is
obvious. This departure was recommended by the Judicature Commissioners.
rThe "special indorsement" of liquidated claims, allowed by Order III,
Rule 6, is a slight extension of §z5 of the Common Law Procedure Act,
18,2. Besides doing away with the necessity for a statement of claim, it
had the virtue of allowing the plaintiff to obtain final judgment at once if
the defendant failed to appear. When the writ was "generally" indorsed he
had to have his damages assessed on writ of inquiry before he could get
final judgment.
' Orders V, VI and VIII.
' The Rules as to concurrent writs and renewal of writs are copied
from §§g, i1, 13 and 22 of. the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, with the
life of the writ put at twelve months inslead of six. A "concurrent" writ
is a duplicate to facilitate- service where there are several defendants.
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upon defendants under disability 3 2 they are principally an adap-

tation of the existing rules. 13 The two departments from which
inconsistencies are removed are substituted service," and service
out of the jurisdiction. The latter phrase comes as a shock to
American ideas of jurisdiction for service, but there is a list of
cases given in the order 135 in which it is permitted, and there are
rules in which the necessary steps are explained. Appearance is the
next subject mentioned; most of the rules in the two orders devoted to it repeat parts of the old rules with some slight
changes.' 8 6 Finally, an entirely new order, the famous Order
XIV, extends and makes more elastic the recovery of summary
judgment in any case where, after appearing to a writ specially
indorsed (therefore, on a liquidated claim) the defendant fails to
convince the court, on affidavit, that his defence on the merits is
sufficient to warrant his being given leave to defend. 1T
'Order IX, Rules 3 to 6 cover service on a wife, an infant, a lunatic
and a partnership.
'The following old rules are repeated, in whole or in part, in Orders
IX. X and Xl: §§15. 16. 1,,-8, Sg and 170 of the Common Law Procedure
Act, 1852; Rule 3 of Hilary Term, 1853; Chancery Order X, Rule 7; Rule
17o of the Admiralty Rules, 1859; and Rules i8 and xg of the Probate Rules,
1

In England service is effected by the parties, not by a court officer."

"Personal service" is handing the defendant a copy of the writ and showing
him the original if he wishes to see it. "Substituted service" is usually by
publication and is ordered by the court only when efforts to make personal
service within the jurisdiction are unavailing. The Pennsylvania method of
allowing service upon a member of the defendant's family or household is
not in use.
" Order XI, Rule z. Previously, under Chancery Order X, Rule 7, the
Court of Chancery had discretionary power to order service out of the
jurisdiction in any case whatsoever. The Rules of 1875 adopted the limitations of the common law rules. §§x8 and i9 of the Common Law Procedure
Act, z852, slightly enlarged. This power to effect service out of the jurisdiction counterbalances, to some extent, the lack of anything like foreign
attachment proceedings in the High Court.
'"The following old Rules are repeated, in whole or in part, in Orders
XII and XIII: §§27. 28, 29, 3, 33, 172, 73. 74. 77 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852; Rules 2, 3, 13 of Hilary Term, 1853. The chief innovations are that partners, though sued in their firm name (as allowed by
Order XVI, Rule 10) must appear personally; and that a plaintiff need not
file a statement of claim if a defendant fails to appear to a writ "generally"
indorsed, but may sign interlocutory judgment and proceed to assess his
damages by writ of inquiry.
This sunimary judgment was previously possible only under the Act
of 1855 mentioned in note t27, sutra. Order XIV extends it to all claims
specially indorsed and allows the judgment to be for part or whole of the
claim, and against less than all the defendants. In this respect, it corre-
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If the 1875 Schedule were divided up into chapters, the
next fifteen orders might be grouped together under the heading
of Parties and Pleadings. These are the most vital in the
schedule, as they introduce into actions at law equitable notions
about the joinder of parties and of causes of action, and impose
upon the procedure in equity in that connection some of the exactitude and brevity which has always been the redeeming virtue
of pleading at common law. Later amendments have made some
alterations in these fifteen orders, but they still remain 13s the
heart of the whole body of English legislation on procedural re139
form.
Three of them relate to parties.1 40 They allow all persons
to be joined in whom or against whom "the right to any relief
claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative.1 141 Parties may be so brought in who are interested
in only a part, if not the whole, of the cause of action; they may
be freely brought in or struck out after the action has commenced, even as late as the trial itself, by any party to the writ,
and the greatest liberality is allowed as to substitution. Equally
elastic are the judgments to be pronounced , they may affect some
or all of the parties, and all or part of the property in dispute.
These rules enlarge greatly the old common law powers1 42 and
add to the Chancery powers that of dealing with the mutual
rights of particular persons singly as well as in the whole controversy. Two innovations worthy of especial note are the right
sponds somewhat to the Pennsylvania judgment for want of a sufficient
affidavit of defence. One of its virtues is in the affidavit which is a prerequisite to leave to defend, as ordinary pleadings are not under oath. The
leave to defend may be either unconditional or subject to terms such as payment in of all or part of the amount in dispute, or immediate trial by a judge
without a jury. This procedure was another of the specific recommendations of the Judicature Commissioners.
' Together with Order XXXVI, relating to modes of trial.
'_ In the main they carry out recommendations made by the Judicature
Commissioners.
"Orders XVI, XVIII and L
' Order XVI, Rules I and 3.
t'§§Ig to 21 of the CommQn Law Procedure Act, zS6o, provided that all
persons who were "supposed to have a right" could join aa plaintiffs, and be
struck out if proper, but even that was restricted within the limits of joint
contractual rights. As to substitution, the old Common Law courts could
add or strike out parties, but they would never substitute.
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given a plaintiff to join two or more defendants if he "is 1 in
43
doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress,1
and the "third party procedure" by which a defendant may bring
in as a third party primarily liable any person from whom he "is,
or claims to be, entitled to contribution or indemnity, or any
other remedy or relief" in connection with the subject matter of
the action.14 4 Both of these have worked wonders in avoiding
multiplicity of actions and expenditure. In the rules as to capacity of parties a striking novelty is the provision that partner45
ships may sue and be sued in their firm names.
A single order suffices to proclaim the new creed as to
joinder of causes of action. As with every new religion, its
foundation is in its new point of view. The test is no longer the
form of the writ or the nature of the right involved, but the
purely empyrical one of the convenient trial of the issues to be
raised. The rule allows all causes of action to be united in the
same claim except such as "cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together.' 1 4 6 Undoubtedly this pronouncement has
been equally as potent as the one unifying all the writs of summons, in breaking down the walls between the forms of action.
It is also specifically provided in the order that parties may join
their own several claims with actions begun on a joint obligation,
and that they may join individual claims with demands sued on
in a representative capacity.14 7 Subject to the risk of having separate trials ordered where causes are inconveniently joined, this
30. Order XVI, Rule 6. This right is, of course, subject to an obligation
on the plaintiff to pay the costs of any person who is cleared of liability.
"Costs," it should be remembered, are a real compensation in England, as
they include counsel fees.
'"Order XVI, Rules i;f to 21, carrying out §24 (3) of the Judicature
Act, 1873. This was another of the Commission's recommendations.
'"Order XVI, Rule ixo. Although partners so sued must appear in person, Order XII, Rule 12, and partners so suing must, on demand, disclose
their individual names, Order VII, Rule 2.
The other Rules on capacity (Orders XVIII and L) are principally an
adaptation of existing rules, under §§H135 to z42 of the Common Law Pro-

cedure Act, 1852. §92 of the Common Law Procedure Act, z8:4, §§42 and 52

of the iS & 16 Vict., c. 86, and Chancery Order XXXII, Rule z.
-order XVII, Rule z.
" Except in the case of a trustee in bankruptcy, Order XVII, Rule 3.
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allows parties an almost unlimited lititude they never before en1 s
joyed. Y
Having declared the new doctrine of parties and causes, the
rest of the orders in this group cover the practical subject of
pleadings. Order XIX, entitled Pleading Generally, has become
the English pleader's vadenwcum; every student at the Inns is
enjoined to commit its principal rules to memory. Beginning
with the general admonition that "statements shall be as brief as
the nature of the case will admit," they go on to stipulate that
"every pleading shall contain as concisely as may be a statement
of the material facts on which the party pleading relies, but not
.theevidence by which they are to be proved," and to describe particularly certain matters (like malice, fraud, notice, etc.) which
may be briefly alleged as facts, and certain other matters (like
denials of material allegations) to support which the pleading
must be full. Sufficient description is given of the forms required, and this is supplemented by the presence of a number of
specimen pleadings inserted in the Appendix. The former common law rules as to amendment and the pleading of new matter
arising after action brought were generous, and these are re14
peated. '
Then the successive pleadings in an action are taken -up
seriatim, in separate orders. First is the Statement of Caim. Its
form and contents are, it is true, determined by Order XIX, but
Order XX fixes the time for its delivery' 50 in various actions, als §41 of the Common Law Procedure Act, i852, had allowed the joinder
of all personal claims between the same parties suing in the same right, but
this extended the liberty to include actions to recover property, and actions
based on any right at all. The check of convenience of trial was a much
easier one than the old equity test of multifariousness. It was adopted from

the Act of i852.

soOrder XX, as to pleading new matter, copies §68 and 69 of the
Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and Rules 22 and 23 of Trinity Term,
1853. Order XXVII. on amendment of writ and pleadings, amplifies §J= of
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, M of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, §36 of the Common Law Procedure Act, i86o, Chancery
Order IX, Rules 17 and 24, and Chancery Order XXXIII, Rule zi, by
providing that any pleading may be amended at any time: once without
obtaining leave, and again after that with leave of the court-subject to
the other party's right to object.
'Pleadings are merely delivered to each other by the parties. They
are not filed of record until judgment is entered, when a copy of all the
pleadings is filed in the. Central Office.
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lows the defendant to waive a statement of claim, 151 and provides
that a special indorsement shall be equivalent to a statement of
claim. 152 The defendant's response to this document is called his
Defence, the time and occasion for which are next prescribed.15
Here, however, further directions than the general rules of Order XIX were necessary, to describe the newly enlarged privilege of counterclaim, 15 4 whereby a defendant could set up in his
defence any right or claim on which he could have founded a separate action against the plaintiff. Such a counterclaim is to be
treated in all respects as a cross-action. If there is no counterclaim pleaded, there would, in an ordinary case, be no further
pleadings, but where a counter-claim is put in the plaintiff is entitled to deliver a reply,15 5 which corresponds exactly to a defence
to a statement of claim. Any pleadings subsequent to reply may
be delivered only by leave of the court. 15 6 To solidify this structure of pleadings, the common law demurrer is retained; it is
provided that any party may demur to any part of any pleading.157 But demurrers were soon abandoned altogether by the
rule-makers 5 s for the more intelligible "objection in point of
law."
Two orders describe the procedure to be followed if either
side does not wish to go on with its case. A plaintiff may discontinue, but only by leave of the court, upon proper terms as to
his opponent's costs and as to any other action being brought.1 5 '
This unifies previous divergencies and is "one of several rules
which materially curtail the plaintiff's freedom of control over
"'This provision was later changed, as it was found useless.
"See notes x24 ind 137, supre.
"'Order XXII unifies the widely divergent practices of the Common
Law courts under §63 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, the Court

of Chancery under Chancery Order XXXVII, Rule 4, the Court of Admiralty under Rule 68 and the Court of Probate under Rule 38.
I"Created by Order XIX, Rule 3, under §24 (3) of the Judicature Act,
1873.

, Order XXIV.
ImThe rules as to delivery of pleadings with or without leave have been
altered since i875.
greatly
1
'Order XXVIIL
'"in 883, when the whole body of Rules was revised.
1
Order XX1IL
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the conduct of the cause, and leave him much less fully domninus
litis than he was before."'160 The other covers default of pleading.""' It penalizes a failure to defend, by judgment final or interlocutory according to the nature of the claim, against some or
all of the defendants, and also prescribes the penalties for default at any subsequent stage in the proceedings.
Now follows a group of orders dealing with interlocutory
matters which in England are roughly described as Chamber
Work, and are under the supervision of the masters, who have
most of the powers of a judge at chambers. Except in one regard,10 2 they repeat substantially the existing practice of the
common law courts, laying it down for the future guidance of
all divisions of the High Court, with some improvements in detail. Of the thirteen orders in this group, three as to payment into court, admissions on the record, and the putting of a
case stated show the least deviation from the previous practice."' s Four orders reflect the equitable spirit implanted into all
divisions of the court; one'64 confers upon the court power to enlarge, for good cause, the time appointed in the rules for the doing of any act, before or after it has expired; another16 5 declares
that non-compliance with any of the rules shall not render a proceeding void, but merely subject to be set aside or amended on
proper terms; a third allows the court to make all orders neces"Wilson: Judicature Acts (1st ed., London, 1875), p. 2=. Another of
importance is Order XLI, Rule 6, for which see note 183 infra. Another
is Order XXXVI, Rule 4, which allows the defendant to enter the action for
trial if the plaintiff fails to do so within the appointed time.
n Order XXIX is built up out of the common law rules in J§93 and 94
of the Common Law Procedure Acts, 1852.
'aThe newly extended powers of appointing receivers and granting
injunctions on the common law side of the court.
'.Order XXX, on payment into court, reproduces, modified, §§7o, 72
and 73 of the Common Law Procedure Act, j852 and Rule ii of Hilary
Term, 1853.
Order XXXII, on admissions, is nearly identical with §§117 and xx8 of
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, Rule 29 of Hilary Term, 1853,
Chancery Rule 7 under the 21 & 22 Vict., c. 27.
Order XXXIV, on case stated, somewhat enlarges the powers exercised
by the court under §§46, 47, 179 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852,
and Chancery Rules 8 and 14 under the 13 & 14 Vict., c. 35.
Order LVII, Rule 6 is one of the most frequently invoked of all the

Rules.
'"Order LIX.

Both these are.entirely new provisions.
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sary for the preservation of rights or property pendente lite, or
the bringing into court of materials necessary to assist the court
in determining the issues before it, 166 and the fourth allows the
parties, or the court of its own motion, to consolidate separate
actions which can be conveniently tried together.1 6 7 Three more
orders 68 describe, in some detail, the procedure to be followed in
the making of interlocutory applications--whether they should
be by motion, by summons, or by rule to show cause, and whether
they should be made in open court or in chambers, or in the district registry. One of these repeats the common law rules as to
practice before the masters and slightly enlarges their jurisdiction. 169 The official regulations as to the size and style of paper
and printing to be used form the subject of a separate order.11 0
But the most important orders in the interlocutory group are
two relating to methods of discovery. The old Chancery procedure had always provided a party with ample facilities for obtaining, before the trial, a knowledge of the facts and documents
on which his opponent proposed to rely, though by methods provokingly cumbersome.' 7 1 The common law courts, too, had a
limited power to order discovery, conferred upon them by the
Common Law Procedure Acts,1 72 which had been found exceed'"Order LII. The court is empowered to order payment in of the
amount, or surrender of custody of property, in dispute; the sale of perishable goods; the appointment of a.receiver or the issue of an injunction;
the inspection of property; the taking of samples; the making of observations or experiments; and if property is withheld not to dispute title, but to
enforce a lien, the surrender of the property upon payment into court of the
amount of the lien.
," Order LI. This is frequently applied in accident cases, where a number of claims arise out of the same act of negligence.
' Orders LIII, LIV and XXXV. The last gives full details as to the
work to be done by the District Registries created under the Judicature
Act of 1873.
'"Order LIV, repeating with a few additions the rule of Michaelmas
Term, 1867, made tnder the 30 & 31 Vict., c. 68, which created the office
of Master in the Common Law courts. In the Chancery Division the
"Masters" are the Chief Clerks to the judges, appointed under the x & x6
Vict., c. 8o, who, in 1897, obtained from the Lord Chancellor the right to
be called Masters.
'"Order LVI. There are also the regulations as to the printing of
pleadings, in the earlier Orders on pleadings.
'n Especially roundabout was the old way of administering, through an
official examiner, interrogatories which went through the whole Bill like a
fine-toothed comb.
"§§5o, S1, 52, 53 and 54 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854.
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ingly useful in eliminating unnecessary issues from the trial. To
obtain the benefit of the extended principles of the Court of Chancery, and combine with them the simplicity *of the common law
methods, the framers of Order XXXI devised a combination of
the two which enabled any party to ascertain with precision just
what he was expected to prove or refute at the trial, and no more.
Briefly, the new system provides that any party may, after the
first pleadings have been exchanged, deliver to his opponent,
without leave, a set of interrogatories requiring sworn answers,
and obtain, upon formal request, a sworn list of all relevant documents in his opponent's possession or power. This is supplemented by proper protection to the answering party, which permits him to refuse to answer improper questions and to refuse inspection of any documents for which he can properly claim privilege. The order gives complete details as to the times and methods for requesting this discovery and for enforcing, by penalties,
the right to it when refused. Minor defects in the previous practice are, incidentally, repaired. 1 8 A further order 74 empowers
the court, of its own motion, to direct the making of any inquiries or the taking of any accounts it considers necessary to a
proper determination of the rights in controversy.
The first three groups of orders have carried the dispute
from the market-place to the door of the court-room. Next in
sequence are eleven orders that might be grouped together as the
rules on Trial and Judgment. Previous orders made it possible
to unite all parties and causes of action in a single proceeding;
these give the court power to separate issues not fit to be tried
together and to pronounce judgment from time to time on parts
as well as the whole of the controversy, on litigants singly as well
as in groups. In short, they carry out the principle that the convenience of trial is hereafter to be the test of the limits of action,
1

For instance, Order XXXI, Rule 23, permits a party to use only one,
or less than all, of the answers he has received to interrogatories. The
former common law rule forced him to put in all the answers or none, at
the trial, so that frequently he could not safely rely on one answer (which
might serve to. eliminate: a minor issue) for fear of damaging his case by
showing the'others.
'Order XXXIII, based on 66 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
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and make that principle widely beneficial by striking improvements in the instruments of trial and judgment.17
To begin with, Order XXXVI abolishes venue and creates
a variety of forms of trial. Under it the trial of an action, regardless of its place of origin, may be held in any county where
a branch of the court will sit. Before, all trials at law had been
before a jury;178 the new rules make it incumbent on one side or
the other to ask for a jury or have the case tried by a judge alone.
They also offer the choice of trial before a judge assisted by technical experts (assessors), or before an official or special referee
sitting with or without assessors. 17 7 This is coupled with a
power in the court to order that some issues in a cause be tried
sooner, and some by a different form of trial, than others, so
that the court is entirely free to deal with however complicated a
controversy in a logical and efficient way by splitting up the issues and having each one tried by the most competent tribunal.
It is further aided by the right to postpone or adjourn a trial
whenever necessary.1 78 As to the conduct of the trial itself, two
orders 79 prescribe the form in which evidence shall be received
and affidavits made, and they allow the court in any case, "for
sufficient reason," to order that any particular facts may be
proved or testimony taken by affidavit.
Coming now to the flexibility of judgments, Order XL allows any party, at any stage of an action, to move for any relief
he appears entitled to by admissions in the pleadings, or, if some
of the issues have been tried and the rest appear to him unimportant, to move for final judgment. The judge, too, has discretion, at the conclusion of a trial, either to reserve judgment, or'"These innovations were among those most strongly recommended by

the Judicature Commissioners in their First Report, 2nd some of them were

put into the Judicature Act itself.

"'§T of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, allowed the trial of
issues of fact by a judge without a jury if both parties consented in writing,
but such consent was not often given.
'"The referees were created in §§s6 to 59 of the Judicature Act, 1873,
with the hope of winning back to the law courts much of the business that
was going to arbitration.
'"OrderXXXVI, Rule 24. This rule is copied from §i9 of the Common

Law Procedure Act, 1854.
"Orders
XXXVII and XXXVIIL
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der it to be entered at once, or order it to be set down for argument before him on points of law.18 0 Finally, even if judgment
has been entered, an objecting party may move to have it set
aside and another judgment entered after argument, without the
necessity for a new trial. On such a motion, as well as on a motion for a new trial,1"" the court is privileged to order the retrial
of separate issues, less than all, and to order the making of any
inquiries or taking of any accounts that seem necessary. New
trials, however, are sternly discouraged by the roles, which forbid the granting of one on the ground of misdirection, or of the
improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless some substantial wrong or miscarriage has been thereby occasioned in the
trial of the action.1 82 Another old practice broken up is the suffering of a voluntary non-suit, which is made equivalent to a
judgment on the merits (unless otherwise ordered by the court),
thus barring another action for the same cause.' 3 The complete
power given the court over costs, in Order LV, enables it to exercise a most useful control over the proper conduct of an action
at all points; the practitioner has ever before him the risk of being ordered to pay his opponent's costs for unnecessary or unfair
obstacles raised. This group concludes with a few miscellaneous
orders as to the duties of officers of the court and the times of
sittings and working hours of the courts and officers. 1 4
Last group of all "that ends this strange eventful history"
is one of nine orders dealing with Appeal and Execution. The
order on appeal is necessarily new, as the Court of Appeal was itself a new tribunal, supplanting the former Exchequer Chamber
and other appellate bodies; but the eight which cover execution
are almost direct transcriptions from the previous rules at common law and in equity. Their repetition in these rules gives the
'"Order
1" Order
"Order
common law
" Order

XXXVI, Rule 22.
XXXIX, Rule 4.
XXXIX, Rule 3. No such provision was made in the previous
rules.
XLI, Rule 6.

' Orders LX and LXI. Orders LXII and LXIII, which may be mentioned here, state that these Rules do not apply to divorce, crown, revenue
or criminal proceedings, and give the interpretation of technical terms used

in the Rules,
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equity side of the court the advantages of the common law writs
for enforcing its decrees, and adds to the legal powers ot execution the equity methods of orders in personam.
The salient points of the appeal order" 5 are that no appeal
may be made without the leave first obtained of either the court
below or the Court of Appeal, that all appeals are to be by "notice of motion" stating the ground of the appeal,'" and that the
Court of Appeal is authorized to exercise all the powers of the
court of first instance as to considering the evidence and entering
or altering final judgment. The order also states the times
within which appeals from various orders must be perfected and
lays down directions for the whole procedure.
The execution orders are, to a large extent, verbatim repetitions of sections of the Common Law Procedure Acts, the Chancery Orders, and the Common Law Rules. They provide for the
usual writs-fieri facias, elcgit,18 7 sequestration,' 8 8 possession, 189 and delivery'--and retain the special procedure
for attachment of the person, 91 attachment of debts,'2
and charging orders on shares of stock, 9 3 in use in one or other
of the old courts. An introductory order codifies the former
rules as to the practice on issuing writs of execution, and applies
them to all divisions of the new court."' There seems to be no
LVIII.
Exceptions and writs of error are abolished.
'" Order XLIII covers these two.
'"Order XLVII. This is taken from Chancery Order XXIX, Rule 3.
'"Order XLVIII, for recovery of possession of land.
'" Order XLIX, for recovery of possession of chattels, since §78 of the
Common Law Procedure Act, 1854.
-t Order XLIV. Leave of the court is made a prerequisite to the issue
of the writ.,
'"order XLV applies the common law rules to all Divisions of the
High Court by repeating, as to Rules, §§6o to 67"of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854. and §§-q) and 30 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 86o.
'"Order XLVI extends to all Divisions the former Chancery practice
instituted under I & 2 Vict., c. 11o. §§H14 and 15, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 82, §r, and
5 Vict., c. 5, by which shares of stock standing in the books of any company
in the name of the judgment debtor could be charged with the debL Their
transfer would then be impossible before payment of the debt.
"Order XLII makes a few additions to §§12o, 123, 124, 125, 128. 129
to 134 of the Common Law Procedure Act. 1852, Rules 71, 73, -6 and 57 of
Hilary Term, 1853, and Chancery Order XXIX, Rule 2.
£3Order
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record of why the diversity in writs of execution was not planed
off together with the differences in writs of summons. No mention is made of the subject in the Report of the Judicature Commissioners, and nothing is said about it in either of the Judicature Acts. It must be presumed there was no active dissatisfaction with the methods of execution in vogue, so the procedure
was left practically untouched; the authors of the Acts and Rules
aimed not at a theoretical perfection of unity, but at the practical correction of existing abuses.
This concludes the survey of the Schedule of 1875. As has
been pointed out, it accomplished great reforms, especially in the
matters of summons, parties, pleadings and trial, but it was
equally tenacious of all that promised well in the existing procedure and let much of it stand, unmentioned. 1 5 The most remarkable feature of its contents is the large number of what previously were firm statutory mandates which now appear as adaptable rules of court,'" warmed into life by the touch of judicial
discretion. It went into operation with the good will of the profession generally, who were heartily sick- of the suspense of the
preceding few years, and cleared the ground for the even greater
changes which forty years of active husbandry have brought
about.'1

T

VIL

The decade after 1873 was one of glorious uncertainty in
the practice of the law. The old court-rooms and their offices
looked familiar enough, 9 s but everything in them was changed
and lawyers trod the mazes of the new procedure warily. No
one knew just how far the Judicature Acts were meant to go in
the grand scheme of "fusing" law and equity, or what their results would be. Looking back now upon forty years of the new
'nNumerous points of detail, such as the whole subject of costs.

The

brief Rule on costs merely gives the court complete power over their distribution among the parties.
-

'Ninety Rules out of the four hundred and fifty-sir.
' Since the revision of 1883 the annual crop of amendments has averaged
twelve in number.
' The Common Law Courts continued to sit at Westminster and the
Court of Chancery at Lincoln's Inn until the opening of the new Royal
Courts of Justice at Temple Bar on December 4, u8z
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dispensation, it is easy enough to see that the substances of law
and equity flourish apart, no matter how their procedures are
combined,""9 but to their contemporaries the first Judicature Acts
seemed to demolish all the old landmarks that bounded the fields
of each. The common law pleader anxiously studied up the
rambling narratives of the equity draftsman, to learn how" he

could forget the highly precise and technical art in which lie had
been bred, and his brother of the chancery bar, with equal trepidation, bade farewell to all those prolix fictions which had made
his bills in equity so formidable to the naked eye. 200 The outcome
"turned out to be the introduction of a mode of pleading so confused and inartistic as to be in many instances only a source of
201
embarrassment and expense.1
Then; to make sure he was committing no error, every practitioner took advantage of every privilege allowed him in the
Rules in thi conduct of an action. He asked for all the discovery and all the amendments and extensions the Rules could possibly warrant ;202 where the Rules were not precisely worded, he
asked for it just to see what would happen, and there were innumerable places where the terms of the Rules were broadly general. In any case, he would appeal from every adverse decision
p.

'Professor Vinogradoff, in his Common-Sense in Law (London t913,
points out that there is "a fundamental difference of methods. In

219),

one system the centre of gravity lies in the formulated rule, and therefore
there is a strong tendency to sacrifice the particular to the general, justice
to certainty; while in the other there is a more direct quest after right and
a wide discretionary power on the part of the judge to draw on his own
notions of what is fair and just." And the English experience enables him
to say truly (p. 232) that equity "does not disappear when special tribunals
of equity are merged by a comprehensive reform of the judicature."
""It was a Bill of this kind," says Mr. Birrell, in A Century of Law
Reform (London, i9oz, p. 182),. "which, when it was served upon John
Wesley in 1745. drew from him the following observations: 'Icalled on
the solicitor I had employed in the suit lately commenced against tne in
Chancery, and here I first saw that foul monster, a Chancery Bill. A scroll
it was in forty-two pages in large folio to tell a story which needed not to
have taken up forty lines, and stuffed with such stupid, senseless, improbable
lies, many of them, too, quite foreign to the question, as I believe would
have cost the compiler his life in any Heathen Court either of Greece or
Rome. and this is equity in a Christian countryl'"
Lord Justice Bowen, in 2 Low QuAmR LY REVIw, 8 (January, x886).
"The Judicature Acts, in perfecting the machinery of litigation, placed
within the reach of every litigant a very complete weapon, but one far too
elaborate and precise for the necessities of every case. The first result was
to increase by something like twenty per cent. the- ordinary expenses of a
common law action." (Lord Justice Bowen, in 2 LAw QuARTERLY Rivrzw.)

290

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

in the course of the proceedings, to have the benefit of judicial interpretation of doubtful passages in the Rules at his opponent's
expense. Appeals accordingly increased enormously -in number-.2 03 Nor was the distracted suitor relieved to learn that frequently his adviser was utterly nonplussed by the presence unrepealed of dozens of old regulations and statutes on subjects so
like those covered by the new Rules that only the authority of a
court of appeal could determine which was the correct practice
to pursue.2 04
To add to the general uncertainty, the Rule Committee began to issue sets of amendments to the Rules, and Parliament
turned out a string of statutes, that affected nearly every branch
of law most used in practice. No less than twelve separate sets of
amendments to the Rules were issued between 1875 and 1883,205
and much unnecessary inconvenience was caused by the fact that
no prompt notice or publication of their issue was given to the
profession. Nearly every year saw a fresh Judicature Act which
made some change either in the organization of the Supreme
Court or in the course and disposition of appeals. 20s But even
' Sir Frederick Pollock, in his Expansion of the Common Law (London, i9o4, p. j5), gives the following description of that time: "Thirty years
ago the authors of our Judicature Acts in England, men of the highest
eminence, but trained exclusively in the Chancery system, went about to
engraft considerable parts of that system on the practice of the Courts of
Common Law. What came of their good intentions? Instead of the
simplicity and substantial equity which they looked for, the new birth of
justice was found to be perplexed practice, vexatious interlocutory proceedings, and multiplication of appeals and costs, so that for several years the
latter state of the suitor was worse than the former. Repeated revision
of the Rules of Court, and some fresh legislation, was needed before the
reconstructed machine would work smoothly."
'Lord Justice Brett is reported to have said (7o LAw Txius 127,
December 25, i8"o), that the Judicature Rules were not carefully drawn with
due regard to the practice existing at the time of the passing of the Acts.
Most of the old procedural statutes were eventually repealed by the Statute
Law Revision Acts of z879, 1881 and 1883, and the rest were codified into
the new Rules of x883, as will be described infra.
'The dates were: December, 1875; February. 1876; June, 1876; December, 1876; May, 1877; June, 1877; November, 1878; March, x879; December,
1879; April, x88o; May, i88o; May, 1883.
'"Some of these were the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, z876 (39 & 40
Vict., c. 59), the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878 (4t & 42 Vict., c. 1g), the
Summary Jurisdiction Act, 87"9 (42 & 43 Vict., c. 49), and the Judicature
Act, i88t (44 & 45 Vict., c. 68). With these may be classed the repealing
statutes which cleared the air of most of the cloud of old procedure: the
Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict, c. 59), the Statute
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more important were the many great reforms in substantive law
carried out in those historic years, under the leadership of two,
such tireless and far-seeing statesmen as Lord Selborne and Lord
Cairns. Among them were the Married Women's Property Acts
of 1874 and 1882,207 the Bills of Sale Acts of 1878 and I8822° 8
and Contingent Remainder and the Mortgage Acts of 1877,209
the Employers' Liability Act of 1880,210 the Conveyancing Act
of I881,211 the Settled Land Act and the Bills of Exchange Act
of i88z,2 12 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1883.213

This flood of

enactments, all of the character that touched every busy lawyer
in his daily practice, added to the troubles with which he was be-

set by the puzzles in the new procedure.
Needless to say, the net result of this combination of disturbing elements was that costs mounted up aggressively, and
gradually there arose a public outcry against the expense of litigation. The Judicature Acts seemed to be defeating their own
ends. 21 4

In a leading article addressed to the Council of Judges,

the TIMEs called upon them to "endeavor to see whether it is not
possible to prevent by a few judicious changes in procedure the
waste and muddling away of suitors' money that goes on out of
court," and added: "They could not do better than employ their
moral influence in favor of reforms the necessity of which is attested as much by the complaints of lawyers that they are idle as
by the murmurs of suitors that they are fleeced." ' 215 Lord Justice
Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act. x88i (44 & 45 Vict, e.68), and the
Statute Law Revision Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict., c. 49).
"37 & 38 Vict.. C. 5o. and 45 & 46 Vict., c. 75.
'41 & 42 Vict., c. 3X, and 45 & 46 Vict., c. 43.
'"40 & 41 Vict., c. 33, and c. 34.
*"43 & 44 Vict., C. 42.
244
& 45 Vic. C. 41.

& 46 Vict., C. 38, and c. 6t.
& 47 Vict., C.52. Other statutes of great practical importance were
the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict., C. 57), the Trade
Unions Act, i876 (39 & 40 Vict., C. 22). the Bankers' Books Evidence Act,
t879 (42 & 43 Vict., c. it), the Solicitors' Remuneration Act and the Newspaper Libels Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 44 and c. 6o), and the Patents Act,
1883 (46 & 47 Vict., C. 57).
"' In a debate in the House of Commons on August It, 1883, the
Solicitor-General, Sir Farrer Herschell (later Lord Chancellor) admitted
the failure of the Judicature Acts in point of economy.
",December i,i88o. Commenting on this and similar articles, the LAw
TiMES remarked (7- L T. 74, December 4,188o): "It will be remarkable
t 45
2' 46
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Bramwell, of the trenchent pen, in a letter to the TIMES, attacked
the English system of itemizing costs instead of charging them in
a lump sum. "There is something wrong somewhere," he said.
"The thing has got into a wrong groove. The system is wrong.
S..The obvious tendency of this practice is to multiply items
and augment costs." 2 16 Some pointed to the abuse of interlocutory privileges as the source of the evil; others to the uncodified
state of the rules of practice,2 17 and a large party were in favor
of the total abolition of pleadings in all actions. 21 8 But the
trouble was a complication of disorders, and merely local treatment was recognized to be futile.
At length, at the end of i88o, there was a way opened (to
use the Quaker phrase) by which Lord Selborne, then lately become once more the occupant of the woolsack, was able to set in
motion a train of events whose consequences brought on the remedy. On September 17, i88o, Sir Fitzroy Kelly, the Chief
Baron of the Exchequer, and on November 2o, Sir Alexander
Cockburn, the Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, died. It had
been impossible in 1873 to sweep away all distinctions between
the three old Common Law Courts, partly because of the personal considerations arising out of the life tenure of the Chief
Baron and the two Chief Justices. But now that factor was eliminated, Lord Selborne at once seized the opportunity to complete
the work of unification he had begun eight years before. He
ifthe constant attention which the most influential journals devote to legal
subjects does not bring about the necessary reforms m our procedure.
'The letter is reprinted in 25 SOLCITORS' JOURNAL, 341 (March 5,z88i).
On this point the same journal said (May 7, 88K, p. 503) : "The apothec ars
bill kind of system which at present prevails is a most miserable and unsatisfactory system, but it is difficult to suggest any wholly satisfactory principle."
"' In a letter addressed to Baron Pollock, Mr. (now Sir) Mackenzie D.
Chalmers made a number of suggestions for steps to effect reductions in
costs, one of which was: "That the statutes, orders and rules of court which
regulated civil procedure t the time the Judicature Acts were passed should
be expressly repealed, and such of their provisions as may still be required
should be incorporated in the Judicature Acts and Rules." The letter is
printed in 7o LAw Ti:,.s, 2o (November 13, z88o). This course was so
obviously necessary that shortly thereafter Mr. Chalmers, together with Mr.
(now Sir) Courtenay P. Ilbert, was engaged in the drafting of the Statute
Law Revision Acts of 88: and 1883, and the incorporation of unrepealed
statufes,ihto the Rulc. -followed soon after. See note 244, iisfru.
' See 25 SOLICI-ORS' JOURNAL, 503 (May 7, :88t) : "Ought Pleadings to
be Abolished?" The LAw TImzs was the only legal journal actually favoring such a drastic measure.
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called together a Council of all the Judges 2 19 which met on November 27 and 29, and he caused them, against a strong minority
which held tenaciously to all the old names and dignities, to pass
a recommendation that the three Common Law Divisions of the
High Court-the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer-should be merged into one, to be called the Queen's Bench
and presided over by Lord Coleridge, the surviving Chief Justice
then in the Common Pleas. On December 16, the Privy Council
220 givissued an Order in Council upon the report of the judges,
ing legal effect to their recommendation, and on February 26,
i881,
the Order coming into operation, the names of Common
Pleas and Exchequer disappeared from the judicature of England.
This outward change in the common law side of the High
Court required corresponding changes to be made in its internal
administration and procedure, and Lord Selborne, with characteristic enterprise, determined to make it the occasion for a general
investigation of the complaints that were making themselves so
insistently heard on every side, with a view to introducing any alterations necessary in the system of civil procedure. The Rule
Committee of Judges then serving, under the Act of 1876, contained no practicing lawyers and its powers were limited within
the confines of the Judicature Acts, so lie considered it was not
the body most suitable for seeking out the causes of dissatisfaction. On January 7, i881, he addressed a letter to Lord Coleridge, who shared his views and sympathies in legal matters to a
remarkable degree, asking him to preside over a committee "to
consider and report upon any changes which it may be desirable
now to make in the practice, pleading or procedure of the High
Court of Justice in connection with or consequent on the union
of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer Divisions,
"'Under §75 of the Judicature Act, 1873. The Act stipulates that such
a Council should be held once every year, but this has not been strictly
observed. Including the meeting of x88o the judges have not held a formal
Council more than half-a-dozen times since 18f3. Lord Chancellor Haldane
said he "could conceive of no more futile proceeding. We should meet and
it would come to nothing." (Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal
Commission on Delay in the King's Bench Division, 1913, vol. II, p. i91.)
'As provided by §32 of the Judicature Act, 1873.
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or otherwise; and also how far it may be expedient to limit in any
respect the rights of appeal at present existing." With the Lord
Chief Justice's assent, Lord Selborne associated with him on
this board of inquiry ten judges and practitioners drawn from all
departments of legal work. Two had served on the original Judicature Commission of i869,-Lord Justice James, a strenuous
reformer, and John Hollam, the most prominent solicitor in
London. Lord Shand, a Scottish Judge, was asked to sit with
the committee, which became known as the Lord Chancellor's
Legal Procedure Committee, to give them the benefit of his
knowledge of Scots procedure, a system known to be most efficient. 221 Besides these there were two more judges, four barristers and another solicitor. 222 As the Committee had no statutory powers or official standing, except the fact of the Lord Chancellor's appointment, it had no power itself to make any changes
in the Rules; it was simply to recommend, in an advisory capacity, what changes should be made by those in authority. 223 Contemporary opinion did not look for great things from it; it was
taken for granted that its work would result merely in the addition of a few amendments to the Schedule of I875, without at22
taining any real relief. '
But it set out at once to dig up the whole field with great
energy and enthusiasm. Its meetings were frequent and long.
Although its proceedings were confidential, rumors of its delib'Quite recently Lord Loreburn wrote to Mr. Justice Lurton who was
working on the new Federal equity rules: "The Scottish system of pleading
is, to my mind, the best." (26 HARvARD LAw RE vw, ior.)
'They were Sir James Hannen, the President of the Probate Divorce
and Admiralty Division; Mr. Justice (later Lord) Bowen; Sir Henry James,
the Attorney-General (who refused the Lord Chancellorship in x886 because
of his opposition to Irish Home Rule); Sir Farrer Herschell, the SolicitorGeneral (later Lord Chancellor); J. C. (later Mr. Justice) Mathew, and
R. T. Reid (later Lord Chancellor Loreburn), to represent the Junior Bar;
and Charles Harrison, the official solicitor. The Lord Chancellor's Secretary, Mr. (now Sir) Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, acted as Secretary to the

Committee.

I Lord Coleridge and Sir James Hannen were ex-offlcio members of the
Rule Committee; Sir Kenneth Muir Mackenzie was also Secretary to that
Committee. Otherwise there was no connection between the two.
s'7 LAw TiMES, 217 (January 29, x88s): "The labours of the committee now sitting to consider-the cost of litigation are not expected to be
protracted, and new rules, as the result of their deliberation, will probably
be issued in the course of next month."
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erations leaked out at odd times during the next few months and
their character gave rise to the most eager speculation upon the
probable result of its findings. It became known that there was
a strong feeling in the Committee that pleadings should be altogether abolished, and this report aroused in legal circles discussions more spirited than any since 1873.25 It was, in fact, true.

Lord Justice James had, even in the days of the 1869 Commission, urged the abandonment of pleadings, and now he was ardently supported by Mr. Justice Mathew, a judge intolerant of
technicalities-who believed that all he needed was to see the parties before him to decide their controversy. 22 8 Another influence
strongly felt in the Committee was that of Lord Shand. He believed strongly in the advantages of the Scottish procedure, in
which the issues between the parties are framed not by the contending pleaders but by an officer of the court itself. With his
support Mr. Justice Bowen invented what has become known as
the "omnibus summons"--a notice by which both parties are
brought before a master, soon after appearence has been entered,
to receive directions governing the entire future conduct of the
action, down to trial-and convinced the Committee of its virtues. It was accepted as a necessary complement to the absence
of pleadings. Then on to the topics of chamber work and discovery the Committee proceeded with'equal originality, and after
them considered in turn the methods of trial, the granting of new
trials, the disposition of appeals, and the aggravating subject of
costs, coming in every instance to definite conclusions which were
embodied, with its reasons, in the Report unanimously signed
which it sent to Lord Selborne.

, Most people were shocked by the news. In February the Incorporated
Law Society submitted to the Committee a resolution opposing such an idea.
The legal journals printed many sarcastic references to it. It seemed to win
some favor, however, for it was said in i6 L~w JOURNAL, 137 (March 26,
1881) : "There are many forms of action in which pleadings are absolutely
thrown away, and there are some few in which they are an economy. What
is required is to separate the two."
= He was appointed to the Queen's Bench early in March, z88r, without
ever having taken silk. In 1895 he succeeded in establishing a separate List
of commercial causes over which he presided. In this List he swept away
written pleadings and technicalities of every sort, coming straight to the
point of every dispute and bringing the Court into high favor with the
London merchants who needed it.
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This Report was anxiously looked for by the legal community, but although it was presented in May of z88i it was not
made public for nearly five months. During that time the Lord
Chancellor submitted the Report to all the judges of the Supreme
Court who had not been members of his Procedure Committee,
in order to obtain from them confidential expressions of -opinion
on the subject-matter of the sweeping recommendations it contained. Their opinions have not been published but it is understood they were by no means a chorus of praise. 22 7 By October
they were all in the Lord Chancellor's hands, and the Report was
duly given to the public. 22 It was found to confine itself exclusively to procedure in the new Queen's Bench Division, not venturing to trespass upon Chancery ground. In twenty-six Resolutions it stated its findings under the Lord Chancellor's order of
reference, making in every one of them bold suggestions for reforms at every stage of common law procedure. Its publication
brought forward a veritable storm of criticism, both favorable
and otherwise, but it was evident that progress in the right direction was at last being made.
In an introduction, the Report states that it aims to show the
benefits of "a change in procedure which would enable the court,
at an early stage of the litigation, to obtain control over the suit,
and exercise a close supervision over the proceedings in the action." That is the keynote of the Report. In harmony with it
are its most striking recommendations, described above, to discard pleadings, and to substitute for them mere notices of special
matter and directions issued by a master under an omnibus summons. The next change it called for was in the freedom with
which discovery could be obtained. The Committee believed
that unnecessary discovery had been the greatest source of needless expense,229 and recommended that it should be strictly superU 16 LAW JOURNAL, 582 (December so, 1881): "It is no secret that there
is great divergence on the bench in reference to the subject of the committee's
report. The Lord Chancellor has asked for the criticism of the judges on
the report and has been liberally supplied." And 72 LAw TiMEs, r27 (December 24, 1881): "There is bz no means unanimity [among the judges)
as to the abolition of pleadings.
'It was published October 3 and appears in full in 25 SoLi mos'
JOURNAL, 911 (October i, 1881).
= "It further appears to the Committee that much of the expense of
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vised by the masters and allowed only by their leave. These
three recommendations were the ones that most attracted the
shafts of the critics. One of these wrote:
"Suitors are to be protected not only against one another,
but against themselves, by a system of paternal care, directed by
that preternatural sagacity, undeviating justice, and disinterested and energetic benevolence which are always supposed to
characterize a despotism, but which have hitherto not been cordially accepted among this self-willed and troublesome race."' 0
And another caricatured the omnibus summons for directions, under which a master was, at the beginning of the action,
to decide how it should be conducted, as:
"This wonderful summons, requiring from the master the
sagacity and prescience of Mr. Micawber, at once to see and
prescribe for all contingencies up to trial 1"23
The principal difference between the Committee and its censurers lay in the interpretation of statistics. The Report pointed
out that in the previous year only four per cent. of all actions begun in the Common Law Divisions had been carried through to
trial, and that in sixty-one per cent. judgment had gone by default either of appearance or of defence; as to the remaining
thirty-five per cent. unaccounted for, the Committee concluded
that these had been dropped or settled out of court, and that in
those cases either pleadings or discovery would have been unnecessary. Its opponents, on the other hand, argued that this
thirty-five per cent. of actions withdrawn was exactly the virtue
of the interlocutory work. "Discovery has frequently been effectual," they claimed, "in producing the settlement, by making
the parties acquainted, before incurring the expense of a trial,
with matters which, without it, they would have learned for the
first time when they were before the court."' 23 2 Perhaps both
litigation is now due to the power which the parties have of resorting to
all the modes of procedure furnished by the Judicature Acts, without regard
to the real requirements of the cases, which might often be dealt with as
simply as summary proceedings before magistrates." (Report of the Committee.)
226 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, xo6 (December 17, i88z).
"27 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 2 (November 4, x82).
s"26 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 69 (December 3, x88).
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sides claimed too much, but undoubtedly the use of interlocutory
applications for discovery, etc., had been abused.
Then there was a recommendation as to the mode of trial.
The Committee's aim was to cut down expense and delay, so it
devised a way of decreasing the number of jury trials by ruling
that all trials should be non-jury except in cases where the master
would allow a jury, on a special application under the summons
for direction. 233 This, and the succeeding resolutions as to new
trials, were received with favor. The Committee suggested that
the right to have a new trial be limited to certain cases, and .that
the application for a new trial should be by notice of motion, like
the application for an appeal, instead of by an ex parte rule to
show cause. Appeals, too, were considered, in seven Resolutions
which cover appeals from the masters to the court and from the
4
High Court to Divisional Courts and the Court of Appeal.23
Finally, as to costs, the Committee recommended a uniform scale
of costs in contentious business in all Divisions of the High Court
to stop the practice of bringing common law actions in the Chancery Division because higher costs were allowed there, and they
recommended that an especially low scale of costs should be
adopted for actions involving £2oo or under, to discourage undue skirmishing for such small amounts. 235 There were a few
"This supervision was also intended to do away with this difficulty
which had arisen: parties would frequently order put down in the jury list a
case which, when it came on for trial, the judge would declare involved
matters of account or similar complicated issues, on which a jury were
absolutely unfit to pass; he would then order the case sent to a referee, or
entered for a non-jury trial. As a consequence, all the counsel, parties and
witnesses, would be sent away to wait until the case came on again in the
list-a most inconvenient penalty to all concerned.
'The substance of these Resolutions is to eliminate double appeals
where formerly allowed, and to make .the leave of: a judge a prerequisite
to appeal in every case.
'From an American point of vidw one cannot help feeling thi the
English have not yet solved the question of how to keep down costs. Lord
Justice Bramwell's plan to charge them in a lump sum rather than by an
itemized bill would probably be a great advance. Perhaps the division of
labor between solicitors and counsel is largely responsible for the evil. In
a spirited letter in 72 LAw TImEs, 321 (March 4, x882), G., describing himself as a solicitor in active practice for forty years, says: "The simple fact
is that the ordinary and average London solicitor is content to be and remain
a mere machine-a mere conduit pipe from client to counseL Does he ever
venture to draw any pleading or any affidavit or notice except those of
ptereotyped form? Dpir¢ he, without counsel, ever attend any judge or
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resolutions on minor points which have been carried out with

23
great benefit. '
Soon after the Report was published, the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, whose members constitute the branch
of the profession in closest touch with the details of procedure,
appointed a large committeee to consider the Report and declare
officially what was the opinion of the solicitors upon it as a
body. 237 The committee reported two months later, approving
some of the Resolutions and condemning others. 238 They approved of nearly all the recommendations except those giving
an official of the court control over the conduct of an action. Especially did they condemn the proposed abolition of pleadings
and the summons for directions that was to help supplant them.
This opinion, without doubt, had some influence on the weight
given totheLord Chancellor's Committee's recommendations when
they came to be considered by the Rule Committee of judges, for
it was a carefully thought out and drafted document, and was
adopted without a dissenting voice when presented to the Law-

Society at a large meeting on February

22, z882.239

At about the same time, the Rule Committee was beginning
the long series of discussions out of which finally emerged the
new code of Rules of 1883. Lord Selborne had just appointed
master at chambers when anything has really to be argued? We know
he never dreams of anything of the kind. He goes to counsel practically
for everything. .

.

. You cannot effectually reduce the time or money

employed in contentious business while the present system of procedure and
the exclusive audience of counsel prevail. The sooner the now entirely
needless distinction between counsel and solicitor, and their dual incumbrance
to the suitor, cease, so much the better it will be, not only for the public, to
whom it would be a great boon, but to lawyers themselves of either class."
'For instance, that each action should be assigned to a particular
master, who should have charge of all steps taken in it. Also that in the
trial lists the jury and non-jury lists should be kept separately. The Resolution that shorthand notes of the proceedings in court should be taken has
never, curiously enough, been followed.
' The committee was appointed November i8, iM8i. with forty London
and thirteen country members, G. A. Crowder, chairman. The list of their
names is given in 26 SoucrroRs' JouRNAL, 104.
'Their report, dated January 3o, x882, appears in 26 SOiCITORS' JOURNAL,
245 (February i8, 1882).
'The SOLIcIrORS' JOURNAL (26 S. J. 255, February 25, 1882), speaks

of "the singular care and ability with which that report has been prepared,
and the admirable constitution of the committee as representing all shades
of opinion."
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the new Committee under the Act of 1881240 and had submitted
to them the Report of his Legal Procedure Committee, together
with the opinions upon it he had received from the other judges.
Although the new Committee was not composed of judges committed to the recommendations of Lord Coleridge and his asso-ciates, their verdict upon those recommendations was, on the
whole, favorable, 24 1 and they prepared at once to go forward
with the work of giving shape to the new regulations. The plan
was to alter such parts of the old Rules as were affected by the
new proposals, and to that end a rough draft of a set of new
rules based on them was placed in the Committee's hands as a
basis for argument.
Almost at the very outset, the rule-makers encountered a
difficulty that brought their progress to a sharp halt. The foremost of the reforms included in the program was the abolition of
pleadings. That was to be accomplished by providing for an indorsement of the plaintiff's claim on his writ, and for mere notices of special matter delivered in lieu of any formal defence or
replication. "The end to be attained sounded simple enough, but
when it came to drafting a Rule which would be clear enough tocover every conceivable class of claim and defence, the Committee could make no satisfactory headway. It soon .became obvious, in the arguments that centered about Order III, that in
cases where the issues were numerous or complicated such a
method of notices would result in a ragged disconnected kind of
pleading entailing more expense than the old. At this juncture,
Baron Pollock made the suggestion that there might be a different treatment provided for the simple cases thati for the complicated ones, and he undertook to draft an Order on that principle.
'"19 of the Judicature Act, x88r, made the Rule Committee consist of
the Lord Chancellor,-the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the
President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division, and four judges
of the Supreme Court named by the Lord Chancellor. The Act was signed
in August, i88t, and at the beginning of January, 1882, Lord Selborne
appointed Lord Justice Lindley, Baron Pollock, and Justices Manisty and
Fry to be the four additional judges.
917 LAW JoUIR-L?, 147 (March 18, 1882): "The Rule Committee of
the judges have decided to adopt in the main the recommendations of the
committee over which Lord Coleridge presided, and nothing now remains
but to settle the details and draft the rules."
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He drew up a list of actions in which he considered the issue to
be so clear that no more was needed than a claim and a denial; in
actions "other than the enumerated actions" he proposed to allow written pleadings under a master's supervision. But upon
closer inspection this solution proved equally illusory; it was impossible to predict what actions would resolve themselves into
simple issues, or even that the simplest might not develop difficulties such as would render the absence of pleadings a hardship
on the parties. The Committee then decided to take expert advice and called in G. Baugh Allen, the foremost pleader of the
day, to help draft the troublesome Order. Allen pointed out
how useless it would be to segregate actions into artificial classes;
his idea was that the Order should merely contain a few brief
words of admonition to the pleader on the beauties of brevity
and should be supplemented by a copious supply of forms; these
forms should cover a varied assortmeit of causes of action, and
should be drafted in model style to serve as the standard to
which pleadings should conform. By setting before the pleader
such examples of what the Committee desired, he believed all
misunderstanding as to what was brief and what was prolix
would disappear. The Committee decided to take this channel
as the only way clear of the rocks, and Allen was commissioned
*to draft the pleading Orders and the forms to accompany them,
under the supervision of Sir Edward Fry, then a Chancery judge
of extreme technical accuracy. 242 That is the story of the present English method of pleading by reference to the forms.
Naturally, all this took time, and the summer of 1882 was
well on its way before the subject of pleading was satisfactorily
disposed of, but although the profession were fretting under the
delay and anxiety of waiting for changes which they knew would
be great, 243 the Committee proceeded slowly and carefully with
the rest of its task. Instead of limiting it to the recommenda'a Now the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry who, since his retirement from
the bench in 1892, has achieved great distinction in various important international arbitrations. He sat from T900 to 1912 as a member of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
34 17 LAw JOURNAL, 401 (July 29, 1882): "It is evident that the ordinary
duties of the judges do not admit of their performing those quasi-legislative
duties with the despatch which is desirable. And nne months later (i8
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tions of the Legal Procedure Committee, Lord Selborne decided
it should complete, in the course of its work, the codification
which was so badly needed. The draftsmen who were engaged
on the repealing act which became the Statute law Revision Act
of 1883244 were instructed to include only such parts of the old
procedural measures as were unmistakably obsolete; all others
they turned over to the Rule Committee to incorporate into the
co'iified Rules, in more or less altered form. With this added
material the Committee completely transformed the old Rules of
1875, working slowly on from Order to Order for over a year.
Different members of the Committee made themselves responsible for the Orders with which they were most familiar, and each
one was worked out separately. The actual drafting was done
by many hands. Each member of the Committee would bring in
the sections in which he had interested himself, and these would
then be carefully revised and edited by the Lord Chancellor and
his Secretary "4 5 to bring them into harmony with each other, especially in the matter of forms of expression. Lord Selborne
LAw JOURNAL, 217, April 21, 1883): "Much of the unsatisfactory state of
legal business at the present time may be traced to the injurious influence
of rules from which qreat changes were expected, which were always coming
but have never 5ome '
'Mackenzie D. Chalmers and Courtenay P. Ilbert, the Parliamentary
draftsmen. The following reference to the work appears in Sir Courtenay
Ilbert: Legislative Methods and Forms (London, xgoi), p. 69: "Soon after
the Judicature Acts came into operation, the Statute Law Committee took
into consideration the question how far previous enactments were superseded
by them or might be superseded by rules of court made under them. Accordingly they instructed Mr. Arthur Wilson to prepare a report on the subject,
and in 1878 he submitted to the committee a report on the statutes relating
to civil procedure and courts. (Parl. Papers, 1878, lxiii.) The work begun
by him was afterwards continued by Mr. Chalmers and the present writer,
and resulted in the passing of the Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Acts of ig8i and 1883, and in the framing of a large number of
rules of court which took the place of previous enactments relating to
procedure"
'Mr. (now Sir)'Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, who, as Secretary to Lord
Selborne, had been Secretary to the Procedure Committee of i88i and was
Secretary to the Rule Committee as well. In 1884 he was made Permanent
Secretary to the Lord Chancellor and his presence, in that capacity, on the
Rule Committee from then on to the present day has been a most important
factor ingiving to the work of the Committee the continuity it would be
otherwise difficult for a constantly changing body to attain. Much of the
actual drafting of new Rules is done by his hand, and all of it is done under
his supervision. In his work on the Rules of 1883 he was assisted by his
brother, Mr. M. J.Muir Mackenzie, who in i9o5 became one of the Official
Referees of the High Court.
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himself did an enormous amount of work in studying the details
of every section of the Rules and forms, to assure himself that
every possible defect and inconsistency had been cleared away.
His "work on the Rule Committee was more complete and exhaustive than that of anyone else; he was personally responsible
for every word. There was literally not one word which he had
not read and considered."' 2 46 Until the end of 1882 the Committee met almost every week to discuss the results as they came to
hand; from January. 1883, on, meetings became even more frequent, until in June the Committee sat almost every day in order
to complete the undertaking before the Long Vacation was upon
them.
In March, 1883, an event occurred which deprived the Committee of the services of one of its most valuable members. Sir
George Jessel, the Master of the Rolls, died suddenly on the
twenty-first of March. He had taken a most active part in the
Committee's deliberations, particularly on the Orders affecting
chancery procedure, and had been especially helpful in giving the
new Rules a practical and workable aspect which would commend
Ithem to the practitioner as well as to zealots for reform. "No
judge did more to carry out the principles and purpose of the
Judicature Acts, and to regulate their operation by the rules of
common sense and practical convenience." 217 His place was
filled by Lord Justice Brett, who succeeded him in the custody of
the Rolls.
At length on July 9, x883, after many months of painstaking work, the eight members of the Rule Committee put their
signatures to the new Rules, and on the following day the Rules
were laid on the table in both Houses of Parliament, in accordance
with the Act. 2 48 Ten days later they were, for the first time, circulated among the profession. They were timed to come into
operation on October 24, the ending of the Long Vacation, and
immediately a great cry went up that there would not be sufficient time to examine the new Rules and consider them before
Note by Sir Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, at p. 93 of vol. II of Lord
(London, j8g8.)
342 (March 24, 1883),
'" §z5 of the Judicature Act, x87S.
'"

Selborne's "Memorials, Personal and Political"
227 SOuCITORS' JOURNA,
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they took effect, as the Long Vacation was then only a fortnight
off. The protest assumed definite shape when Sir Hardinge
Giffard 24 9 moved in the House of Commons for an address to
the Crown praying that an Order in Council should be made annulling the Rules, because of the lack of time for consideration,
and both branches of .the profession sent official resolutions favoring the motion. It was the first time the procedure had been
resorted to since the Judicature Act established it, and the debate
on August i i brought out some interesting opinions on the constitutional aspects of the Rule Committee as a law-making
body.250 The Government did not oppose the motion as a party
measure, but despite the non-party vote the motion was lost, the
feeling in the House being that it was unwise for the Executive
to interfere with the Judicature Rules unless the judges attempted to effect some grave constitutional change under the
color of rules of practice. After that the active members of the
Inns of Court and the Law Societies settled down to study the
new Rules and Forms, and many a man's vacation in the summer of z883 was made weary by the companionship of that bulky
volume. On October 24, they went into effect, and have since
been the basis of the Supreme Court practice, frequently amended
but never revised.
(To be Continued.)
Samuel Rosenbaum.
London
" Then in Opposition. Later Lord ChaiceUor Halsbury0 when the
Conservatives took office in June, i885.
Reported in Hansard, vol. 283, 3rd series, pp. 146-187.

